This paper is an investigation of the relationship between conditional objects obtained as a qualitative counterpart to conditional probabilities, and nonmonotonic reasoning. Roughly speaking, a conditional object can be seen as a generic rule which allows us to get a conclusion provided that the available information exactly corresponds to the "context" part of the conditional object. This gives freedom for possibly retracting previous conclusions when the available information becomes more specific. Viewed as an inference rule expressing a contextual belief, the conditional object is shown to possess all properties of a well-behaved nonmonotonic consequence relation when a suitable choice of connectives and deduction operation is made. Using previous results from Adams' conditional probabilistic logic, a logic of conditional objects is proposed. Its axioms and inference rules are those of preferential reasoning logic of Lehmann and colleagues. But the semantics relies on a three-valued truth valuation first suggested by De Finetti. It is more elementary and intuitive than the preferential semantics of Lehmann and colleagues and does not require probabilistic semantics. The analysis of a notion of consistency of a set of conditional objects is studied in the light of such a three-valued semantics and higher level counterparts of deduction theorem, modus ponens, resolution and refutation are suggested. Limitations of this logic are discussed. The rest of the paper is devoted to studying what remains of the logic in the setting of numerical probability theory.
I -Introduction
The idea of a conditional object corresponds to an attempt to give a mathematical and logical meaning to a conditional relationship between two logical propositions p and q in agreement with the notion of conditional probability P(q | p) but independently of the notion of probability. A conditional object is thus associated with a pair (p,q) of Boolean propositions and denoted q | p which reads "q given p" and is such that Prob(q | p) can indeed be considered as the probability of the entity q | p (and not only as the probability of q, in the context where p is true). This kind of study was pioneered by De Finetti [13] [14] and Schay [53] among others (see, e.g., [38] ). There has been several recently published works along this research line, especially Calabrese [6] , Goodman and Nguyen [37] , Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [38] , Dubois and Prade [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . See also Goodman, Gupta, Nguyen and Rogers [36] for a collection of contributions.
One way of considering a conditional object is to see it as a defeasible inference rule interpreted as "if p is true then q holds but for exceptional cases". This point of view is quite in accordance with the usual understanding of a high conditional probability except that no attempt is made to quantify the presence of exceptions. The antecedent p is viewed as a description of a context in which plausible conclusions can be drawn. It differs from the usual notion of inference in the sense that refining the context may invalidate conclusions previously held as plausible. This nonmonotonic behavior is usual in probabilistic reasoning where the probability P(q | p) can be high while simultaneously the probability P(q | p ∧ r) can very well be small.
Purely symbolic approaches as well as numerical models for reasoning under incomplete or uncertain knowledge have insisted on the importance of the correct handling of the context in which an inference is made ; see Léa Sombé [41] for a comparative overview of symbolic and numerical approaches. Among others in the symbolic school, Reiter and Criscuolo [52] , Touretzky [59] have quite early considered the problems raised by the simultaneous presence in the knowledge base of default rules whose condition parts have various level of specificity (e.g., "if p then r generally" and "if q then ¬r generally" while p logically entails q). Using a different terminology, Kyburg [40] has based his reasoning strategy on the choice of the right "reference class" (which is not always, according to him, the most specific one on which we have some information available), while Bayesian probability supporters emphasize the fact that a probability is always a conditional probability in order to take into account the current context (see Cheeseman [10] and Pearl [50] for instance).
In this paper we develop preliminary works reported in [20] [22] [23] , and mainly focus our attention on the possible relationship between the three-valued calculus developed on conditional objects like q | p and nonmonotonic reasoning systems based on the study of nonmonotonic consequence relationships as studied by Gabbay [28] and more recently by Lehmann [42] , Makinson [46] , Kraus et al. [39] , Lehmann and Magidor [44] . There is a natural similarity between the notions of nonmonotonic consequence relationship and that of a conditional object. Such a similarity becomes patent if we reconsider a conditional logic proposed by Adams [1] . He interpreted q | p as P(q | p) ≥ 1 -ε where ε is positive but arbitrarily small, developed a conditional logic that supports this semantics and found higher level inference rules that turn out to overlap those that have independently emerged from the study of nonmonotonic consequence relationships. In the probabilistic camp, Pearl [50] and his student Geffner [31] have borrowed Adams' conditional logic to develop a nonmonotonic reasoning system that closely maps the one developed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [39] in the symbolic camp. The former thus claim that the natural semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning is probabilistic, while the latter use preferential semantics based on binary relations on models.The comparative study of conditional objects and the weak consequence relations used in nonmonotonic logics thus seems to be a natural and worth-considering question to investigate. In this paper, this is done by exploiting a natural semantics of conditional objects that is neither probabilistic nor based on preference relations, but relies on a 3-valued truth assignment. Although this 3-valued semantics seems to apply to all approaches to conditional objects, the choice of connectives and the definition of logical consequence we shall advocate will be dictated by the specific view of a conditional object as a tool for plausible inference. See Goodman [35] and Walker [60] for general investigations on the links between 3-valued logics and conditional objects.
In the next section, the necessary background on conditional objects is restated in the framework of finite languages, with emphasis on the 3-valued semantics. Section III is devoted to the logic of conditional objects viewed at the syntactic level as weak consequence relationships in the sense of nonmonotonic inference. Section IV briefly introduces metaresolution and refutation in a conditional knowledge base. Section V examines the agreement of probability theory with nonmonotonic logic and shows that extensions of the properties of nonmonotonic consequence relationships still hold in the case of numerical probabilities, but are inefficient from an inference point of view.
II -Conditional Objects : The 3-Valued Semantics
In the paper we shall consider conditional objects of the form q | p where p and q are well-formed formulae on a classical propositional language L. T denotes the tautology and F denotes the contradiction.The number of propositional variables is assumed to be finite. The usual notion of semantic entailment is modelled by the ordering . on L defined by p . q ⇔ ¬p ∨ q = T (we use the equality sign for denoting the equivalence between propositional sentences). Let t denote a usual truth-assignment induced by an interpretation ; t(p) = T means that p is true in this interpretation and t(p) = F means that p is false. Assuming a linear ordering such that F < T on {F,T}, we have p . q ⇔ t(p) ≤ t(q) for all truth-assignments. The set of conditional objects on L will be denoted L | L. Given a conditional object q | p, p is called its context, and q its conclusion. In order to attach truth-values to conditional objects we adopt a 3-valued semantics first proposed in pioneering works of De Finetti [14] and independently by Schay [53] , among others, and also suggested by the authors [18] .
Let {T, F, U} be an extended truth-set where T and F mean true and false, and the third value U means undefined. T and F can be viewed as special propositional variables. U is also viewed as a non-standard propositional variable. Classical propositions can only be true or false, i.e., t(p) ∈ {T,F}, ∀ p ∈ L. In a given interpretation, the truth-assignment of a conditional object q | p is defined by extending classical truth-assignments over to conditional objects as follows :
∀t, t(q | p) = t(q) if t(p) = T = U otherwise i.e., the truth-assignment of q | p exactly copies that of q when p is true. Following De Finetti [13] [14] , but using the terminology of Adams [1] , a conditional object is said to be verified by an interpretation whenever t(q | p) = T, i.e., t(p) = t(q) = T and falsified if t(q | p) = F, i.e., t(p) = T, t(q) = F. A conditional object is said to be verifiable if there exists an interpretation that verifies it and falsifiable if there exists an interpretation that falsifies it. When t(q | p) = U the conditional object can be viewed as being inapplicable or disabled ; another quite different way of interpreting t(q | p) = U, is to say that, whenever p is false the truth-value of q, as determined by p, is unknown. Clearly q | p is akin to an inference rule, rather than a classical proposition, and differs as such from the material conditional p → q = ¬p ∨ q which is such that t(p → q) = T whenever t(q | p) = U. The conditional object q | p can be viewed as expressing our belief that q is true in the context p.
The above definition can be particularized to characterize specific conditional objects :
• Conditional objects of the form p | T are such that t(p | T) = t(p). Hence any unconditional formula p can be mapped to a conditional object p | T.
• Conditional objects of the form p | F are such that t(p | F) = U, i.e., are always inapplicable ;
• Conditional objects of the form p | p are never falsified, but they are not always applicable. Especially p | p is not a full-fledged tautology, but a conditional tautology. More generally conditional tautologies are of the form q | p where p . q. They are all semantically equivalent to T | p.
• Conditional objects of the form ¬p | p are never verified and are contradictory only in a context where p is true. They will be called "conditional contradictions". More generally, they can be of the form q | p where p ∧ q = F. They are all semantically equivalent to F | p.
The first part of the proposition says that a conditional object q | p can be interpreted as a set of formulae whose lower bound is p ∧ q (interpreting U as F systematically) and upper bound is p → q (interpreting U as T systematically) ; in other words, considering a classical proposition as an element in a Boolean algebra, a conditional object can be viewed as an interval in a Boolean algebra. The second part of the proposition says that conversely any interval in a Boolean algebra, or equivalently any pair of propositions one of which entails the other, is equivalent to a conditional object. Namely if ϕ . ψ then a conditional object equivalent to the interval between ϕ and ψ is ϕ | ψ → ϕ since ϕ ∧ (ψ → ϕ) = ϕ and ¬(ψ → ϕ) ∨ ϕ = (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ ϕ = ψ ∨ ϕ = ψ. In set-theoretic-terms, a conditional object can be equated to a pair of nested sets (see [60] ).
The above view of conditional objects suggests an ordering relation < on {T, F, U} whereby F < U < T, since U is viewed as any element in {F,T}. It leads to an extension of the entailment relation from L to L | L, namely q | p . s | r ⇔ t(q | p) ≤ t(s | r).
As pointed out by Goodman and Nguyen [37] , this is the canonical extension of . to intervals. The following property can be checked
This is obvious using the interval understanding of q | p. This definition of "meta-entailment" makes sense in the scope of conditional objects considered as default inference rules. Define an interpretation in the classical way as a truth-assignment of all propositional variables of L. An interpretation corresponds to a state of facts where the truth of propositions can be checked. An interpretation is said to be an example of the rule if under this interpretation, the corresponding conditional object is verified ; a counter-example is an interpretation which falsifies the conditional object. Then q | p . s | r means that any example of q | p is an example of s | r, and any counter-example of s | r is a counter-example of q | p since p → q . r → s is equivalent to r ∧ ¬s . p ∧ ¬q. Hence s | r is in some sense valid at least as often as q | p insofar as the former has at least as many examples and not more counter-examples than s | r. Note that the meta-entailment is reflexive and transitive. The above notion of entailment looks natural in the scope of interpreting conditional objects as default rules. Other types of entailment relations make sense. See Calabrese [7] [8] for several other proposals and their mutual relationships.
A noticeable consequence of Proposition 2 is that p ∧ q | T . q | p . p → q | T a fact which is in total agreement with the interval view of conditional objects.
Two conditional objects q | p and s | r are said to be equivalent if and only if both q | p . s | r and s | r . q | p hold. This is clearly equivalent to p = r and p ∧ q = s ∧ r, i.e., they have the same context and in this context they are simultaneously verified [14] . For equivalent conditional objects we write q | p = s | r. In particular q | p = (p ∧ q | p) = (p → q | p) = (p ↔ q | p). The meta-entailment verifies some properties, some of which make conditional objects similar to material conditionals, some of which make them quite different : i) context equivalence : if p and p' are logically equivalent then q | p = q | p' ii) conclusion weakening : if q . q' then q | p . q' | p.
However, although with material implication p → q . p ∧ r → q, the corresponding property q | p . q | p ∧ r is generally not true for conditional objects, because it is false that p ∧ q . p ∧ q ∧ r. However, the two conditional objects q | p and ¬q | p ∧ r cannot be verified together by the same interpretation. But a conditional object that is verified in a given context by an interpretation, can be falsified in a more restricted context by another interpretation. In particular, taking the view of plausible inference, despite t(p | T) = t(p), p | T means that p is a priori plausible, not that it universally holds, since it can be defeated in a more restricted context.
Let us turn to the question of connectives. There are several ways of addressing this problem, and various extensions of conjunction and disjunction over to conditional objects have been suggested by Schay [53] , Calabrese [6] , Goodman and Nguyen [37] , but also Adams [1] in his probabilistic framework. Sticking to the 3-valued logic approach, the question comes down to extending truth-tables from {T,F} over to {T, F, U}, as done in a systematic way by Walker [60] . Here we shall perform this task with a view to remaining consistent with nonmonotonic reasoning applications, that is, keeping in mind that a conditional object models context-dependent plausible inference, but assuming truth-functionality of connectives over {T, F, U}.
In accordance with the idea that a conditional object stands for a default inference rule, a conjunction of conditional objects will stand for a collection of conditional objects forming a rule base K. The problem is thus how to compute a truth-assignment for K as a whole, in terms of the rules in K. Let us assume that t(q | p AND s | r) is a function of t(q | p) and t(s | r). The following constraints restrict the possible definitions of the AND, modelled by a binary operation * on {T, F, U} i) * coincides with usual conjunction ∧ on {T,F} ii) U * U = U iii) * is commutative iv) U * T ≠ F v) Bayes conditioning : t(q | p AND p | T) = t(p ∧ q | T).
Let us justify these choices in the light of our view of conditional objects as default rules of inference. i) Coincidence with classical conjunction accounts for the assumed equivalence between p and p | T. ii) The property U * U = U is justified by the fact that if in a rule base K, no rule is applicable, then K is considered as not applicable. iii) Commutativity is due to the fact that K is a set. iv) U * T ≠ F sounds natural, namely, if K is falsified then at least one rule in K is falsified. The last condition v) says that if p is a priori plausible and q is plausible when p is true then p ∧ q should be a priori plausible as well. This is a logical version of Bayes conditioning P(p ∧ q) = P(q | p) · P(p). In terms of truth-values, it claims that in order for p ∧ q to be true, it is enough that p be true and q | p verified. But if p is false, p ∧ q is false too. It leads to the constraint F * t(q | p) = F, hence F * U = F. This equation expresses the converse of iv) since it says that it is sufficient that one rule in K be falsified, in order to falsify K. The above constraints only leave two choices open for the conjunction of conditional objects as shown by the two resulting truth-tables on Figure 1 . Indeed the only free choice left is whether U * T = U or U * T = T. The canonicity of this definition has led Goodman and Nguyen [37] to adopt this definition. It has the merit of being easily generalized to any connective in a systematic way. In the following this conjunction will be called interval-conjunction and denoted by ∧.
-) U * T = T. This definition has been adopted by Calabrese [6] . It comes down to assuming a different ordering < on {T, F, U} where U is the top element, i.e., F < T < U. This connective will be called a quasi-conjunction after Adams [1] and denoted by &.
Proposition 3 :
The interval conjunction ∧ and quasi-conjunction & of conditional objects can be expressed as follows
Proof : It is enough to check that for each AND (i.e., ∧ and &), t((q | p) AND (s | r)) = min(t(q | p),t(s | r)) where the minimum operator is taken on the ordered sets {F < U < T} and {F < T < U} respectively. Indeed these orderings lead to the two above truth-tables. Q.E.D.
A third conjunction corresponding to the ordering {U p F p T} has been considered by some authors (e.g., [53] ) ; it leads to define q | p AND s | r as q ∧ s | p ∧ r, but it does not satisfy Bayes conditioning, since F * U = U (a falsified rule in K is not enough to falsify K). In the scope of default reasoning only one of the two conjunctions ∧ and & defined above is worthconsidering. Namely if K = {q | p, s | r} is a set of two default rules then it should be considered applicable to a situation as soon as one of the rules is applicable. This occurs whenever the situation corresponds to a truth-assignment such that t(p ∨ r) = T. Hence the conditional object equivalent to K should have p ∨ r as a context. Another way to put it is as follows : if all rules but one are disabled (e.g., t(q | p) = U) and the remaining one is verified (t(s | r) = T) then the rule base should be considered as verified, i.e., U * T = T. This means that only the quasi-conjunction of conditional objects sounds reasonable for our purpose.
The two conjunctions can also be compared by means of Venn diagrams, considering q | p as the nested pair (p ∧ q, p → q). Namely if A is the set of models of p ∧ q, and B ⊇ A the set of models of p → q, and C ⊆ D represent s | r likewise, we have (see Figure 2) ( It is easy to check that both conjunctions are associative, commutative, idempotent.
The negation of a conditional object denoted by '-', is naturally defined by requiring that it coincides with the usual negation on {T,F} and that it returns U when applied to U. It leads to define the antonym -(q | p) of q | p using a negation function on {F, U, T} such that -F = T, -T = F and -U = U. The latter can be explained either due to -{F,T} = {¬F,¬T} = {F,T} in the interval view, or by assuming that the antonym of an inapplicable rule is also inapplicable. Then, -(q | p) = ¬q | p.
i.e., the negation of a "rule" is the rule with the opposite conclusion. In set-theoretic notation, if a conditional object is represented by the nested pair (A,B), its antonym -(A,B) is the conditional object (ä B,ä A) where the overbar denotes the complementation.
Another concept of negation can be expressed using set-theoretic complements on {F, U, T}, i.e., the negation of {F} is {U,T}, etc. In that case, when q | p is verified the negation of q | p would mean that q | p is falsified or inapplicable. We shall denote ¬(q | p) this notion of negation, noticing that ¬(q | p) is not stricto sensu a conditional object, since ¬(q | p) is verified when t(q | p) ∈ {F,U}, and so on. In fact, ¬(q | p) may serve to express statements like "q | p is not verified".
The disjunction of two conditional objects can be defined as De Morgan duals of the above conjunctions with respect to antonymy, namely
These disjunctions indeed satisfy:
They can be truth-functionally defined as t((q | p) OR (s | r)) = t(-[-(q | p) AND -(s | r)]) where the minimum is taken on the ordered set corresponding to the chosen AND. Then t((q | p) OR (s | r)) = max(t(q | p),t(s | r)) where the maximum is taken on the ordered set {F < U < T} for the interval disjunction, and {U p F p T } for the quasi-disjunction (since we have to exchange the places of F and T and to reverse the scale). Note the reversed ordering when passing from the quasi-conjunction to the quasi-disjunction; besides the interval disjunction does not yield the same context as the interval conjunction.
It is interesting to study the orderings induced by < and p on conditional objects (just as the ordering F < U < T is associated with the semantic entailment . between conditional objects). Define t(q | p) < t(s | r) if and only if t(s | r) < t(q | p) does not hold and t(q | p) p t(s | r) likewise.We can prove t(q | p) < t(s | r) if and only if r . p and p → q . r → s t(q | p) p t(s | r) if and only if p . r and p ∧ q . r ∧ s This can be easily established. For instance, consider the first ordering F < T < U. Then t(q | p) < t(s | r) is equivalent to the four conditions t(s | r) = F ⇒ t(q | p) = F ; t(s | r) = T ⇒ t(q | p) ≠ U ; t(q | p) = U ⇒ t(s | r) = U ; t(q | p) = T ⇒ t(s | r) ≠ F, which can be equivalently rewritten r ∧ ¬s . p ∧ ¬q ; r ∧ s . p ; r . p ; p ∧ q . ¬r ∨ s. These four conditions can be simplified further into the two above conditions. The result associated to the other ordering can be similarly established. As it can be seen, each of the two above orderings borrows one of the conditions defining . and adds another condition pertaining to the specificity of the context. Yet, the two orderings p and < induce the same equivalence between conditional objects, that is, t(q | p) < t(s | r) and t(s | r) < t(q | p) hold if and only if s | r = q | p, and the same for p. Since the quasi-conjunction & is associated with <, and is truth-functional we have that [7] [8]:
Thus, we see that the result of the quasi-conjunction of two conditional objects, one having a more specific context than the other, yields the one with the more general context if and only if the exceptions to the conditional object with the most specific context are also exceptions to the other conditional object (since q | p & s | r = q | p ⇔ r ∧ ¬s . p ∧ ¬q and r . p). Thus, this happens in particular in the case where the rule with the most specific context also has the most general conclusion. In this paper we shall study the type of inference obtained by means of the two operations (&, .) and that we claim is quite appropriate for plausible reasoning. The above results suggest that eight other types of inference can be imagined, some of which are discussed by Calabrese [7] [8], since there are 3 possible choices for the conjunction and 3 possible choices for the entailment.
In this paper, we do not consider the iteration of the conditioning process, i.e., considering higher-order conditional objects such as r | (q | p) or (r | q) | p. There are several ways of doing it. A first approach is to let them be higher-order entities with respect to conditional objects (e.g., [38] ). Another view is to reduce them to ordinary conditional objects ; for instance in the scope of probability theory it is natural to accept (r | q) | p = r | q ∧ p (see [6] ). See Dubois and Prade [22] for a discussion on the reduction of iterated conditionals, in terms of the 3-valued semantics presented here. In the following the language is restricted to unconditional sentences and conditional objects whose context and conclusion are unconditional sentences.
III -Conditional Knowledge Bases
A conditional knowledge base is here a set of conditional objects K = {q i | p i , i = 1,n}.
In the following C(K) will denote, in agreement with Adams [1] , the quasi-conjunction of conditional objects in K. It is tempting, as done earlier by the authors [23] to define entailment from K using C(K) and the ordering . on conditional objects, i.e., K entails q | p means that C(K) . q | p. However this definition has a serious drawback, pointed out in [23] , namely we do not have that if q | p ∈ K then C(K) . q | p (this was also noticed by Adams [1] , hence the name "quasi-conjunction"). To see it, consider K = {q | p, s | r}. Suppose there is an interpretation that verifies s | r but neither verifies nor falsifies q | p. It only requires that (s ∧ r) ∧ ¬p be not a contradiction. In that case t(C(K)) = T but t(q | p) = U, hence t(C(K)) ≤ t(q | p) (using the interval-ordering) is wrong. This fact can also be visually checked on 
More generally, the following, apparently disappointing, result can be shown.
Proof : Assume C(K) = ψ | ϕ. C(K) . q | p means ψ ∧ ϕ . q ∧ p and ϕ → ψ . p → q where the arrow denotes the material implication. Now
and this is in turn equivalent to the two entailments :
Let us find a characteristic property for i). Note that if t(r) = F, i) reduces to (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ϕ ≡ ψ ∧ ϕ . p ∧ q which always hold. i) also trivially holds if t(r) = T, t(s) = F. When t(r) = T, t(s) = T, i) reduces to ϕ → ψ . p ∧ q. On the whole i) is thus equivalent to (r ∧ s)
As for ii), this entailment is always valid : indeed if t(r) = T, it reduces to s ∧ (ϕ → ψ) . p → q and if t(r) = F, it reduces to ϕ → (ϕ → ψ) . p → q and both obviously hold by assumption. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 means that examples of rule s | r should either be captured by the context of K or be examples of rule q | p.
Another problem is that while conditional tautologies should always be taken for granted, we may find p, given K, such that C(K) . p | p does not hold. Namely, if p . ◊ i p i does not hold, we may have again t(p | p) = U while t(C(K)) = T. One way of fixing these problems is to define entailment from a conditional knowledge base in a more flexible way, as Adams [1] did in a probabilistic context : Definition 1 : K entails q | p, denoted K . q | p, if and only if either there exists a non-empty subset S of K such that C(S) . q | p, or p . q.
The case when K . q | p for conditional objects that are never falsified (p . q) is thus taken into account at least by letting S = Ø in the definition. Hence we always have K . p | p for any conditional knowledge base K although ¬p | ¬p . p | p does not hold. However we have {¬p | ¬p} . p | p because S(Ø) . p | p by convention. Note that if K contains F | F then we do have F | F . q | p when p . q, hence C(S) . q | p for S ≠ Ø. An empty conditional knowledge base can thus always be considered as equivalent to one that contains only rules that can never be applied. Now it is easy to check that {q | p, s | r} . q | p, and that if K . q | p then K ∪ {s | r} . q | p. The entailment of conditional objects from a conditional knowledge base is thus monotonic, reflexive and transitive, it is a genuine consequence relationship albeit among objects of higher order than usual propositions.
Let us turn to the consistency of a conditional knowledge base K. It might also be tempting to define it in terms of the quasi-conjunction C(K), namely ascribing that C(K) be not a conditional contradiction, i.e., / ∃p, C(K) . ¬p | p, or equivalently t(C(K)) = T for at least one interpretation (i.e., C(K) is verifiable). However, again there might exist situations where C(K) . ¬p | p for some p, while C(K ∪ {s | r}) is not a conditional contradiction, since U & T = T. For instance, t((¬p | p) & (s | r)) = T if t(p) = F, t(s | r) = T. Hence, contrary to the propositional case, inconsistency can be hidden in a conditional knowledge base by other verified conditional objects. Hence the following Definition 2 : A set of conditional objects K is said to be consistent if and only if for no subset S ⊆ K does C(S) entail a conditional contradiction.
If K does not contain a conditional object with a contradictory context, K is consistent if and only if ∀ S ≠ Ø s.t. S ⊆ K, C(S) is verifiable. Adams [1] calls "confirmable" a set K of conditional objects such that C(K) is not a conditional contradiction. The above definition of consistency also belongs to Adams, although he was basically interested in finding a condition ensuring the possibility of attaching arbitrary high conditional probability values to each conditional object in K (what he called p-consistency). He proved that the above definition of consistency was a necessary and sufficient condition for p-consistency. Pearl [51] and Geffner [31] 's works owe much to Adams' probabilistic view of conditional objects.
Another view of conditional knowledge bases has been proposed by Lehmann [42] , without any reference to probability although he mentions Adams' conditional logic. Lehmann [42] considers what he calls "conditional assertions" of the form p + q, read "from p sensibly conclude q", as a syntactic object. More specifically p + q means that "if p represents the information I have about the true state of the world, I will jump to conclusion that q is true". It is natural to interpret a conditional assertion p + q as a conditional object q | p. Lehmann [42] has given a list of inference rules that can act on a set of conditional assertions. These inference rules correspond to basic postulates that govern commonsense reasoning handling generic knowledge and coping with exceptions in the presence of incomplete evidence. These postulates are as follows :
Left logical equivalence : from p ↔ p' = T and p + q deduce p' + q (LLE) Right weakening : from q . q' and p + q deduce p + q' (RW) Reflexivity :
from p + r and q + r deduce p ∨ q + r (LOR) Cautious monotony : from p + q and p + r deduce p ∧ q + r (CM) Weak transitivity : from p ∧ q + r and p + q deduce p + r (cut)
Lehmann [42] calls "preferential" a nonmonotonic consequence relation + satisfying the above postulates and names P the corresponding logic. Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [39] prove that the following rules of inference can be derived from the above set of postulates Right AND : from p + q and p + r deduce p
It is interesting to compare the properties of relation + to the ones of the classical consequence relation ; (or its semantic counterpart). Namely ; verifies all the above postulates but is transitive (while + is not) and monotonic. The name cautious monotony (CM) is because the property of + is weaker than the monotonicity of the classical consequence notion : p ; r implies p ∧ q ; r. And the cut rule is a weak form of transitivity (p ; q and q ; r imply p ; r). The rules RAND and RW ensure that the set of formulas {q, p + q} that can be derived with condition p will be deductively closed. Property (S) looks like one half of the classical deduction theorem p ∧ q ; r ⇔ p ; q → r.
Going from conditional assertions to conditional objects means to turn p + q into q | p. Moreover the syntactic deduction of r + s from {p + q, p' + q'} will be semantically interpreted as the entailment {q | p, q' | p'} . s | r after Definition 1. Now we can try to prove that the semantic entailment from a conditional knowledge base is indeed compatible with the postulates of preferential entailment, namely we claim that Lehmann's syntactic construct offers a syntax and a proof machinery for the logic of conditional objects. Proof : Left logical equivalence and right weakening correspond to context equivalence and conclusion weakening. The LOR rule, cautious monotony and cut obviously hold for the semantic entailment using Lemma 1 and C(K) . q | p ⇒ K . q | p. Reflexivity holds since p | p is never falsified, and is entailed by any set of conditional objects. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 :
Remember that although reflexivity holds, we do not have C(K ∪ {p | p}) = C(K) generally, while in propositional logic adding a tautology to the set of propositions do not change its models. There may be some interpretations that verify C(K ∪ {p | p}) but not C(K). We now define a syntactic conditional entailment, denoted ; in the following, from a set of conditional assertions, denoted K, as done by Lehmann [42] .
Definition 3 : K ; p + q if and only if p + q can be derived from K using p + p as an axiom schema and the inference rules LLE, RW, LOR,CM and cut of logic P. Now using Proposition 5 we can assert a soundness result. Let K be a set of conditional objects and K be the corresponding set of conditional assertions :
Proof : Assume K ; p + q. If p . q then K ; p + q is always true using reflexivity and RW. K . q | p also holds because K . p | p and p | p . q | p. If p . q is not true then there is a subset S ⊆ K such that S ; p + q. The set of conditional assertions that will be effectively used in the derivation of p + q could include some conditional assertion induced by reflexivity and RW, i.e., assertions of the form p i + q i where p i . q i . Let B be the set of the tautological conditional objects that correspond to these supplementary assertions, and B the set of these assertions. The derivation of p + q forms an acyclic directed graph whose leaves form the set S ∪ B and the root is p + q. Due to Proposition 5 we can turn each local derivation {r + s, r' + s'} ; r" + s" into (s | r) & (s' | r') . s" | r". Hence we have C(S ∪ B) . q | p. It remains to prove that C(S) . q | p. This is due to the fact that in general, even where r . s we may have C(S ∪ {s | r}) . q | p but not C(S) . q | p, due to the effect of the context of s | r. To check it, it is enough to verify that each time an inference rule is used on a tautological assertion such as p i + q i with p i . q i , its counterpart in terms of conditional objects is not needed to ensure the semantic entailment :
•
(¬p ∧ ¬q) ∨ r since the last expression equals ¬q ∨ r due to ¬p ∨ r = T ; 
As a consequence not only do we have C(S ∪ B) . q | p but also C(S) . q | p, since we can cancel all conditional objects in B when forming the quasi-conjunction in the derivation graph.
In order to reach completeness a basic fact is now established, namely a derived inference rule that exactly matches the quasi-conjunction.
Lemma 2 :
The rule {p + q, p' + q'} ; p ∨ p' + (p → q) ∧ (p' → q') can be derived from the rules LLE, RW, RAND, LOR, and reflexivity.
Proof : Again we follow the track of Adams' [1] study. Note that the following inference rule can be derived (p + q) ; (r ∨ p + p → q). Indeed from p + q, p + p→ q follows by RW. By reflexivity r ∧ ¬p + r ∧ ¬p holds, hence r ∧ ¬p +p → q from RW. By the LOR rule we get r ∨ p + p → q. Using the new derived rule on {p + q, p' + q'}, we derive, by letting r = p' and then p, the two conditional objects p ∨ p'+ p → q and p ∨ p' + p' → q'. By the RAND rule the lemma holds.
Q.E.D.
Due to the lemma, we can acknowledge the following derived inference rule in System P :
where C(K) denotes the conditional assertion associated to the quasi-conjunction of the conditional objects associated to the conditional assertions in K.
Completeness theorem : If K . q | p then K ; p + q
Proof :
The first case is when p . q then K ; p + q using reflexivity and RW. Assume p . q does not hold. If K . q | p then ∃ S ≠ Ø, C(S) . q | p, where S ⊆ K. Let S be the set of conditional assertions associated with S. Using QAND we know that S ; C(S). Let C(S) = ϕ + ψ. C(S) . q | p means that ϕ ∧ ψ . p ∧ q and ϕ → ψ . p → q. Using reflexivity and RW we can write ψ ∧ ϕ + ψ ∧ ϕ, ψ ∧ ϕ + p ∧ q. Now, {ψ ∧ ϕ + p ∧ q, ϕ + ψ} ; cut ϕ + p ∧ q, and we can derive both ϕ + p, and ϕ + q using RW. Now {ϕ + p, ϕ + q} ; CM ϕ ∧ p + q. Besides ϕ → ψ . p → q implies p ∧ ¬ϕ . q and ¬ϕ∧ p +q can be derived from reflexivity and RW. Finally, {ϕ∧ p +q, ¬ϕ∧ p + q} ; LOR p + q. Using transitivity of ; we get
What is obtained here is a formal system for handling exception-tolerant if-then rules, whose (meta) inference rules are exactly those of the system P of Lehmann, but whose semantics is a simple 3-valued extension of the true/false semantics of classical logic ; in particular it owes nothing to infinitesimal probabilities (as in Adams conditional logic) nor to partial orderings on possible worlds and the like (as in [39] These results open the road to deduction methods for plausible reasoning based on semantic evaluation. In order to check that K ; p + q, where ; is the preferential entailment of Lehmann, or equivalently, the p-entailment of Adams (when K contains only conditional objects) also denoted ; 0 by Pearl [51] and Geffner [31] , it is enough to check that ∃ S ⊆ K, t(C(S)) ≤ t(q | p) using truth-values, where t(C(S)) is computed in a truth-functional way using the table in Figure 1 . 
Although we did not need any probabilistic view of conditional objects, the above result are not entirely new in the sense that they owe much to Adams' conditional logic and the proofs of the completeness are very similar to (although simpler than) Adams' completeness proof with respect to probabilistic entailment, because for the most part the machinery he used was independent of any probabilistic semantics of conditional objects, although he did not point out this fact in his 1975 book.
IV -Refutation and Resolution in Conditional Knowledge Bases
The aim of this section is to show that conditional knowledge bases have deductive properties that are similar to propositional knowledge bases. Then we outline an algorithm for performing automated deduction. First let us establish the link between inconsistency and conditional deduction Q.E.D.
The result obtained in Proposition 6 has actually be noticed in the infinitesimal probability setting by Adams [1] and Geffner [31] . It is similar to the property of propositional knowledge bases whereby if B is a consistent set of propositions, B . p if and only if B ∪ {¬p}is inconsistent. The property trivially holds too when B is inconsistent but this is no longer trivial with conditional objects. If a conditional knowledge base K is inconsistent it does not entail all conditional objects. For instance F | r does not entail q ∧ ¬r | ¬r : when t(q) = t(r) = F we get t(F | r) = U and t(q ∧ ¬r | ¬r) = F. However, if p . r then ∀q, {F | r} . q | p since ¬r . ¬p ∨ q. Hence even when not consistent, K can produce non-trivial deductions as we shall see, for contexts which are not more specific than the ones of conditional contradictions entailed by the knowledge base. Proposition 6 can be extended to the following conditional object counterpart of a result of Lehmann Proof : If p . q then ¬q | p = F | p hence K ∪ {¬q | p} . F | p. The converse holds since K . q | p is always true. Assume p . q does not hold. Then K . q | p means that C(S) . q | p for some non-empty subset S ⊆ K. Let C(S) = ψ | ϕ like in the proof of Proposition 6. Then we have ϕ ∧ ψ . p ∧ q and ϕ → ψ . p → q. We now must prove K ∪ {¬q | p} . F | p, and it is sufficient that C(S) & (¬q | p) . F | p to achieve it. This means the two conditions i) (p ∨ ϕ) ∧ (p → ¬q) ∧ (ϕ → ψ) . F. This has been established in the proof of Proposition 6 ii) (p ∨ ϕ) → ((p → ¬q) ∧ (ϕ → ψ)) . ¬p.
The latter is obtained as follows using ϕ → ψ . p → q : 
It only remains to check that if (ii) holds, that is, whenever t(p ∧ ¬q) = T, then t(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) = T. Indeed assume t(p) = T, t(q) = F in (ii)
. It reduces to ϕ → ψ . F, i.e., t(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) = T.
When K is inconsistent, let I(K) = {p, K . F | p}, and ϕ K be the disjunction of formulas in I(K). Then the only interesting inferences (i.e., not obtained due to the inconsistency) are of the form q | p where p . ϕ K does not hold. It is as if all models ϕ K should be ruled out from further consideration. ϕ K will be called the inconsistency context of K.
Proposition 6 suggests the use of refutation as a tool for checking conditional entailment. Pearl [51] and Geffner ([31] Chapter 3, Section 5) have actually given another definition of consistency of a conditional knowledge base. If q | p is a conditional object, let p → q be its material counterpart. Let S* be the set of material counterparts of the conditional objects in S. Then K is consistent if and only if ∀ S ⊆ K, ∃ q | p ∈ S, such that S* ∪ {p ∧ q} is consistent. Clearly, this is equivalent to requiring that for all subsets S of K, C(S) be verified at least for one interpretation, i.e., that one conditional object in S be verified while none of the others is falsified. A conditional object q | p ∈ S such that S* ∪ {p ∧ q} is consistent is called "tolerated" by S in Pearl [51] . This suggests the use of Pearl's System Z algorithm to check the consistency of a set of conditional objects.
Namely let K 1 be the subset of conditional objects each of which is tolerated by K, and, for i > 1, K i be the subset of conditional objects each of which is tolerated in K -K 1 ∪ K 2 ∪… ∪ K i-1 . Two situations may occur : either there is n > 0 such that K = K 1 ∪ K 2 ∪ K 3 ∪… ∪ K n and ∀ i = 1,n, K i ≠ Ø, or there is i > 0 such that K 1 ∪ K 2 ∪… ∪ K i-1 ≠ K and K i = Ø. In the first situation, K is consistent. Indeed if S ⊆ K, then there is i ∈ {1, 2, …, n} such that S ⊆ K i ∪ K i+1 ∪… ∪ K n , and S ∩ K i ≠ Ø. Clearly, any q | p ∈ S ∩ K i is tolerated by K i ∪ K i+1 ∪… ∪ K n , hence is tolerated by S as well. Hence C(S) is verifiable. In contrast, if K i = Ø for some i then it means that no interpretation verifies C(K -K 1 ∪… ∪ K i-1 ), and K is thus inconsistent. This consistency-checking method was first hinted in Adams ([1] page 53). It indicates also that consistency checking requires at most m classical consistency checking tests, where m is the number of conditional objects in K. It is then easy to estimate the complexity of reasoning with conditional objects. Note that Lehmann and Magidor [44] have come up with similar considerations within the preferential model setting. Particularly, it is clear from their Theorem 2.26 that they also use the quasi-conjunction C(S) of K for subsets of K.
Given a consistent set K of conditional objects, checking that K . q | p comes down to checking the inconsistency of K ∪ {¬q | p} using the following algorithm : The rationale behind this algorithm is as follows : if K ∪ {¬q | p} is inconsistent then the ranking procedure must fail because there will be a subset S of K ∪ {¬q | p} containing {¬q | p} which is not verifiable. Hence the algorithm tries to isolate such a subset by taking away conditional objects that are tolerated by all others. The algorithm also takes advantage of the fact that since K is consistent, the only source of inconsistency is the presence of ¬q | p. Once ¬q | p has been captured by the tolerance test, the procedure can stop. This test is performed first within each loop of the algorithm. When K is inconsistent, the above algorithm does not work. Nevertheless, it is possible to find out the inconsistency context ϕ K of the K by means of the toleration test. Let K 1 , …, K i-1 be disjoint subsets of K such that ∀ j = 1, i -1 the elements of K j are tolerated by K -K 1 ∪… ∪
be the set of conditional objects that do not tolerate one another. 
If we restrict (i) to when t(ϕ K ) = F, if enforces t(ϕ') = F since ϕ' . ϕ K (due to S' ⊆ K*)
It makes a problem only if t(ϕ K ) = F. Again it enforces t(ϕ') = F and (ii) then reduces to ϕ" → (ϕ" → ψ") . p → q which is what we expected. What we proved is that if S c = {q i | p i ∧ ¬ϕ K , q i | p i ∈ S"} ⊆ K c , we do have C(S c ) . q | p ∧ ¬ϕ K , hence K c . q | p ∧ ¬ϕ K .
Q.E.D.
However the converse is generally false. Indeed, if K . q | p and
¬q | p hold we may have K c . q | p ∧ ¬ϕ K . Indeed, if S = {q | p, s | r}, it is clear that generally, neither S . q ∧ s | r ∧ p nor S . ¬q ∨ ¬s | r ∧ p hold. Yet, if we assume p ∧ r not to be inconsistent then S' = {q | p ∧ r, s | p ∧ r} . q ∧ s | p ∧ r. Hence, restricting the contexts of conditional objects in a conditional knowledge base K is not equivalent to restricting the contexts of the conditional objects inferred from K. It clearly points out that we may have K c . q | p ∧ ¬ϕ K while neither K . q | p nor K . ¬q | p hold. Hence the above algorithm cannot be adapted simply to when K is inconsistent : checking that p . ϕ K does not hold and that K c .
q | p ∧ ¬ϕ K does not ensure K . nt q | p. Even worse, while K -K* is consistent K c could be inconsistent (assume q = ¬s in the above example). Note that Proposition 9 does not hold if we change K c . q | p ∧ ¬ϕ K into K -K* . q | p just deleting the inconsistent subset K*. For instance K = {q | p, q | r, ¬q | r} is inconsistent, but K . nt q | p ∨ r. K* = {q | r, ¬q | r}, and {q | p} . q | p ∨ r does not hold generally. For more considerations on inference from inconsistent conditional knowledge bases ; see Goldszmidt and Pearl [34] . They suggest, as the above results confirm, that such a kind of inference is not an easy task.
Note that in our logic of conditional objects we have not used the quasi-disjunction in the expression of conditional knowledge nor in the expression of the derived conclusions. However the following property holds : p | q∨ r = p | q + p | r. In the language of conditional assertions this property formally corresponds to another rule called Disjunctive Rationality by Kraus et al. [39] :
from ¬(q + p) and ¬(r + p) deduce ¬(q∨ r) + p (DR) or equivalently from q∨ r + p deduce q + p or r + p.
This rule cannot be derived from system P (see [27] ). This state of facts suggests that the above representation theorem of system P by means of conditional objects captures only the fragment of the logic of conditional objects where quasi-disjunction is not used.
Using the quasi-disjunction we can prove other counterparts of several other classical inference rules and results. Namely, in classical logic, the following properties hold
The following counterparts to the above properties hold using the quasi-disjunction : The proof is a simple matter of checking truth-tables (see Appendix 2) ; note that only the cases when the truth-value U appears need be checked since the above properties reduce to classical ones when T and F only are used. Note that the meta-deduction theorem is closely related to Proposition 7 (letting v = F, u = r).
Whether it is interesting to take advantage of these results for automated reasoning with conditional knowledge bases is a matter of further research. In particular it would presuppose a decomposition of a conditional object into a clausal form, i.e., q | p = & i (+ j q ij | p ij ) where the p ij and the q ij are canonical formulas such as literals. Actually, it is easy to decompose a conditional object into a disjunction of more elementary ones when it is of the form p ∨ q | r ∨ s since
This result is used by Calabrese [8] to prove a normal disjunctive form for conditional objects. However this decomposition works provided that the context and the conclusion of the conditional object be itself in normal disjunctive form. And then the elementary terms (p, q, r, 
V -Advantages and Limitations of the Logic of Conditional Objects
What can we do with conditional knowledge bases ? Our thesis is that the logic developed here is a contribution to the proper handling of plausible reasoning in expert systems. A crucial distinction has been made in expert systems between the "factual base" and the "rule base". The former encodes evidence on a given case, while the latter encodes generic domain-knowledge. In the expert system literature, evidence is modeled by instantiated (elementary) formulas, while knowledge is modelled by universally quantified formulas, usually Horn clauses. As a consequence, the handling of exception-tolerant rules proves impossible : either we forget about exceptions and contradictions appear when putting together facts and rules, or we express exceptional situations in the rules and the latter can no longer be triggered in the presence of incomplete information [41] . One solution to this problem is to encode generic domain-knowledge not as first-order formulas but as conditional objects. Then (as suggested in the Penguin example), exception handling becomes imbedded in the inference process. But instead of using the inference engine for enriching the factual base as in classical expert systems, the inference engine must use the machinery of system P and produce new rules until a rule is derived that fits the evidence as a whole. Namely if E contains propositional evidence and K is a conditional knowledge base then the reasoning methodology is to find the set of conclusions r such that K . r | E. While the inference . is monotonic at the meta level, it is nonmonotonic at the level of plausible (factual) conclusion. For instance in the penguin case E = {b,p} saying that Tweety is a bird and a penguin we have {f | b, b | p, ¬f | p} . ¬f | p ∧ b while if E = {b} only, {f | b, b | p, ¬f | p}. f | b. Clearly, in the question-answering mode, the inference engine can use the refutation algorithm or semantic evaluation.
The logic presented here has also the merit of displaying the difference between two modes of belief revision : evidence focusing and knowledge expansion that can be defined as follows -Evidence focusing : a new piece of evidence p arrives and makes the available information on the case at hand more complete. Then E is changed into E ∪ {p} (supposedly consistent). K remains untouched. But the plausible conclusions from K and E ∪ {p}, i.e., r such that K . r | E ∧ p, may radically differ from those derived from K and E.
-Knowledge expansion : it corresponds to adding new generic rules tainted with possible exceptions. Insofar as the new knowledge base is consistent it is clear that due to the monotonicity of inference ., all plausible conclusions derived from K can still be derived from K' since if K is a subset of K' and K . r | E then K' . r | E. But more conclusions may perhaps be obtained by K'.
-Knowledge revision : it encompasses the situation when the result of adding new generic rules to K leads to an inconsistency. In that case some mending of the knowledge base must be carried out in order to recover consistency. Preliminary results along this line are in Boutilier and Goldszmidt [5] .
The distinction between focusing and expansion cannot be made at all in revision theories that represent cognitive states by sets of formulas in propositional logic, such as Gärdenfors [29] theory.
Another type of revision of a conditional knowledge base is the addition of a constraint that must be imperatively satisfied by all considered situations, under the form of a proposition ψ that must be always satisfied. It is similar to an integrity constraint in deductive data bases. It is not possible to achieve this modification by a simple addition of the "unconditional object" ψ | T to K since it only means that "in the absence of any information ψ is plausible". Hence ψ can be defeated. One solution to this problem is to modify the condition part of all conditional objects in K, restricting them to ψ-true situations ; that is, change each q | p in K into q | p ∧ ψ. This change may greatly affect K since it may turn originally distinct conditional objects into equal ones and inhibit others, that can no longer be falsified nor verified (if p ∧ ψ = F). The formula ψ must also be added to the evidence set. If K ψ = {q | p ∧ ψ, q | p ∈ K} then r will be a plausible conclusion of (E,K) under constraint ψ if and only if K ψ . r | E ∧ ψ. Note that q | p ∧ ψ . s | r means q ∧ p ∧ ψ . s ∧ r and r ∧ ¬s . (p ∧ ¬q) ∧ ψ, i.e., any example of q | p that satisfies ψ is an example of s | r, and any exception to s | r is an exception to q | r and satisfies ψ. Note that K ψ might be inconsistent even if K is not.
Another proposal made in Lehmann and Magidor [44] is to interpret a constraint ψ as the addition of the conditional object F | ¬ψ to K. As suggested by Proposition 9 above K ∪ {F | ¬ψ} . nt q | p implies K ψ . q | p ∧ ψ but the converse is generally false. However in the particular case above, because K is consistent we do have the converse : Proposition 10 : K ψ ; q | p ∧ ψ entails K ∪ {F | ¬ψ} . nt q | p, when K and K ψ are consistent and p ∧ ψ is satisfiable.
Proof : Let S ⊆ K ψ such that C(S) . q | p ∧ ψ and C(S) = α | β. Then α ∧ β . q ∧ p ∧ ψ, β → α . (p ∧ ψ) → q, and β . ψ since the contexts of conditional objects in K ψ are all implicants of ψ, a property which is stable under union. We have to prove that C(S) ∪ {F | ¬ψ} . q | p. This reads ((β → α) ∧ ψ) | (β ∨ ¬ψ) . q | p. It remains to check Finally, note that adding ψ to K as a constraint is a kind of knowledge revision that is certainly not equivalent to adding ψ as a new piece of evidence. Namely, if r is a plausible conclusion of (E,K) under constraint ψ, it does not imply that r is a plausible conclusion of (E ∧ ψ, K), i.e., focusing strikingly differs from revision. For instance, it is not true that {q | p} . q | p ∧ ψ while under constraint ψ we do have {q | p ∧ ψ} . q | p ∧ ψ. However, if r is a plausible conclusion of (E ∧ ψ, K), adding ψ as a constraint maintains r as a plausible conclusion of (E,K) under this constraint. Goldszmidt and Pearl [34] have studied special kinds of constraints called strict rules p ⇒ q, and interpret them in the probabilistic setting as P(q | p) = 1. They differ from material implications p → q because the set {p ⇒ q, p ⇒ ¬q} is viewed as inconsistent. This is achieved by assuming that P is a proper probability assignment, i.e., P(p) > 0. It would be worth-investigating some counterparts of strict rules in conditional objects for accommodating rules as a "penguin are birds" in a non-defeasible way without using ¬p ∨ b as a constraint, as in the above example.
The monotony of knowledge expansion is due to the cautious nature of the inference based on system P. In particular, (see, e.g., [31] ) it does not handle the problem of irrelevant properties. For instance, considering again the penguin case, if K = {f | b, b | p, ¬f | p}and y means yellow, then neither K . f | y ∧ b nor K . ¬f | y ∧ b hold. The reasoning system refrains from assuming that properties not dealt with in K are irrelevant to properties appearing in K. One way of capturing irrelevance and making the inference more productive has been proposed by Lehmann [42] (see also [44] ) who introduces the so-called rational closure of a set of conditional assertions as a set of conditional assertions obtained by the rules of P augmented by the following rule that is stronger than cautious monotony Rational monotony : from ¬(p + ¬q) and p + r deduce p ∧ q + r (RM)
It means that if nothing tells us that, in situations where p is true, q is plausibly false, while we know that in these situations the truth of r is plausible, then we can jump to the plausible conclusion that in situations where p and q are true, the truth of r is plausible. It is then easy to derive y ∧ b + f on the Penguin case using RM. Note that it is difficult to express RM by means of conditional objects because the meaning of ¬(p + ¬q) corresponds to ¬(¬q | p) that differs from q | p and is not a conditional object (see Section II). Actually, one might express RM using the quasi-disjunction, due to the equivalent formulation p + r implies either p + ¬q or p ∧ q + r leading us to check whether r | p . (¬q | p) + (r | p ∧ q) holds. And in fact it does hold since it comes down to r | p . ¬q ∨ r | p. We again face the problem that system P does not handle disjunction at the syntactic level, i.e., there is no disjunctive counterpart of the QAND rule in Section III. In fact RM cannot be used without caution as an inference rule acting on the preferential closure of a set of conditional assertions because testing ¬(p + ¬q) leads to multiple extensions of the conditional knowledge base. A proper definition of the rational closure involves the ordering of K introduced by Pearl [51] . The rational closure notion of Lehmann [42] actually leads to the same ordering as the one used by Pearl when he tries to strengthen Adams' probabilistic logic. Makinson and Gärdenfors [47] also consider P + RM in connection with belief revision postulates, and Benferhat et al. [4] propose an embedding of RM in possibilistic logic [17] .
VI -Probabilistic Semantics of Conditional Objects
An unconditional uncertainty measure g on L is a mapping from L to [0,1] that obeys the following requirements
R1 is clearly a consequence of R3. It is interesting to extend the domain of g to L | L and construct conditional uncertainty measures. A numerical setting for quantifying uncertainty can be put on top of conditional objects under the form of a set-function g(· | ·) that maps L | L to the unit interval [0,1]. We of course let g(p | T) = g(p), ∀p since t(p | T) = t(p). The following other requirements look natural :
One of the two following additional postulates might be found natural to compute the conditional uncertainty measure.
i) Cox axiom [12] : g(q ∧ p) = f(g(q | p), g(p)) This postulate can be justified by the equality q ∧ p | T = q | p & p | T with conditional objects, although conditional objects were not known by Cox. He has shown that this postulate, along with the assumption that g(¬p) = 1 -g(p), imply that g is a probability measure if f satisfies suitable regularity properties. In fact it is enough that f be strictly increasing in each place (see, e.g., [21] ). In that case f = product and we recover g(q | p) = g(p ∧ q) / g(p), the usual conditional probability.
This is justified by the interpretation of a conditional object as the pair (p ∧ q, p → q). Then requirement CR4 forces h to be increasing in each place. The study of admissible functions h when g is a given uncertainty measure (probability, belief function, etc.) is beyond the scope of this paper. However note that if h(x,y) = x x + 1 -y , and g is a probability measure we do find
i.e., the usual conditional probability. See Dubois and Prade [22] [23], Nguyen and Smets [49] for more details on the link between uncertainty measures and conditional objects. Here we shall only consider the case of conditional probabilities.
Adams [1] has proved that if a set of conditional objects is consistent in the sense of Definition 2, i.e., for any subset S ⊆ K, C(S) can be verified, then it is possible to allocate to each conditional object in K a probability that is arbitrarily close to 1. This seems to have led Adams [1] to interpret conditional sentences in terms of infinitesimal conditional probabilities of the form P(q i | p i ) ≥ 1 -ε where ε is positive and arbitrarily small. The logic of infinitesimal conditional probabilities of Adams is very similar to system P of Kraus et al. [39] . The nonmonotonic systems studied by Pearl [50] [51] and Geffner [31] pursue the works of Adams with emphasis on probabilistics and preferential semantics. Here, we have shown that it is possible to dispense with such a sophisticated concept as infinitesimal conditional probabilities (as well as complicated preference structures) in order to equip system P with a semantics.
Closely related to Adams are the ordinal conditional functions of Spohn [55] [56] . They are functions κ from L to the set of positive integers such that κ(p ∨ q) = min(κ(p),κ(q)) and κ(T) = 0 κ(p) is viewed as an integer-valued degree of impossibility of p. Spohn [56] points out that κ(p) = n can be related to a non-standard degree of probability P(p) such that P(p) · ε -n is finite, where ε is infinitesimal. This is denoted P(p) ¡ ε n here. Then it is obvious that if p ∧ q = F, P(p) ¡ ε n and P(q) ¡ ε m then P(p ∨ q) ¡ ε min(m,n) , and that this is true even if p ∧ q ≠ F since max(P(p),P(q)) ≤ P(p ∨ q) ≤ P(p) + P(q). We recognize the axiom of the κ-functions. Clearly, the properties of infinitesimal probabilities owe little to the addivitivity axiom itself. κ(p) can thus be viewed as the order of magnitude of a very small probability. These transformations carry over to conditioning. Indeed conditioning a κ-function leads to define κ(q | p) = κ(p ∧ q) -κ(p) [55] [56] . This is in accordance with probability theory since if P(p ∧ q) ¡ ε n and P(p) ¡ ε m then P(q | p) = ε n-m . This integer-based uncertainty framework is the basis of a nonmonotonic reasoning approach that is slightly more quantitative than system P, developed by Pearl under the name Z + [32] . In [23] [24], we indicated that the function ∏ κ (p) = k -κ(p) , where k > 1 is nothing but a possibility measure in the sense of Zadeh [62] and that the conditioning of k-functions is mapped to Dempster rule for conditioning [54] specialized to consonant plausibility functions. Such a semi-quantitative framework certainly deserve further investigations in the scope of nonmonotonic reasoning (see [34] for significant results along that line, including a treatment of belief revision).
Let us turn to purely quantitative settings. Given a conditional knowledge base K, is it possible to assign a conditional probability P(q i | p i ) to each conditional object q i | p i ∈ K in such a way that the set of conditional probabilities so obtained be consistent ? Namely, numerical consistency means that the probabilities P(q i | p i ) can be assigned fixed values α i for all q i | p i ∈ K, so that the set of probability measures {P : P(p i | q i ) = α i , i = 1,n} is not empty.
This question has been addressed by De Finetti [15] and his followers (e.g., [11] ). Note that this notion of consistency is different from and weaker than the one in Definition 2 for conditional objects. A qualitatively inconsistent conditional knowledge base can be numerically consistent. For instance{q | p, ¬q | p} is inconsistent while it is numerically consistent (letting P(q | p) = P(¬q | p) = 0.5).
Assume now that the probabilities P(q i | p i ) have been assigned fixed values α i for all q i | p i ∈ K. One may wonder whether it is still possible to use the inference rules of Lehmann's system P to make inference. It turns out that the rules of system P hold under degenerated forms as follows : -Conclusion weakening : if p . p' then P(p' | q) ≥ P(p | q) -AND rule : P(q ∧ r | p) ≥ max(0, P(q | p) + P(r | p) -1) -OR rule : P(r | p ∨ q) ≥ max(0, P(r | p) + P(r | q) -1) -Cautious monotony : P(r | p ∧ q) ≥ max(0, P(q | p) + P(r | p) -1) -Cut rule : P(r | p) ≥ P(r | p ∧ q) · P(q | p).
If p ∧ q = F the OR rule can be improved into P(r | p ∨ q) ≥ min(P(r | p), P(r | q)). Clearly, when P(q | p) and P(r | p) are small, then the above bounds are no longer informative and we cannot expect any completeness from these rules with respect to upper and lower probability bounds on conclusions. But the closest to 1 are the probabilities, the more efficient these rules. Amarger et al. [2] , Dubois et al. [16] , Thöne et al. [58] propose more efficient inference rules for upper and lower conditional probability propagation. See also Dubois and Prade [26] for quantitative versions of the above rules using relative orders of magnitude.
We may think of other probabilistic interpretations of the conditional object q | p. For instance Neufeld [48] uses P(q | p) > P(q) for expressing that "p favors q", as a qualitative probability counterpart of a default rule. However, with this interpretation the cautious monotony does not hold. Namely from P(q | p) > P(q) and P(r | p) > P(r) it does not follow that P(r | p ∧ q) > P(r) as proved by the following counter-example : P(p ∧ q ∧ ¬r) = 0.1 = P(p ∧¬q ∧ r), P(¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r) = 0.8. Then P(p ∧ q) = 0.1 = P(p ∧ r), P(p) = 0.2, P(q) = 0.1 and P(r) = 0.1, and we can check that P(p ∧ q) = 0.1 > P(p) · P(q) = 0.02, P(p ∧ r) = 0.1 > P(p) · P(r) = 0.02, while P(p ∧ q ∧ r) = 0 < P(p ∧ q) · P(r) = 0.01. Similarly the cut rule is violated, i.e., from P(q | p) > P(q) and P(r | p ∧ q) > P(r) it does not follow that P(r | p) > P(r)
A counter-example is obtained for P(p ∧ ¬q ∧ r) = 0 = P(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r)) = 0, P(p ∧ q ∧ r) = 2/7 and the probabilities of the five other interpretations are 1/7. Then P(p ∧ q) = 3/7, P(p ∧ r) = 2/7, P(p) = 4/7, P(q) = 4/7, P(r) = 4/7, and P(p ∧ q) = 3/7 > P(p) · P(q) = 16/49, P(p ∧ q ∧ r) = 2/7 > P(p ∧ q) · P(r) = 12/49, while P(p ∧ r) = 2/7 < P(p) · P(r) = 16/49.
Wellman [61] has considered another probabilistic interpretation of weak statement of the form "if p then q generally", namely P(q | p) > P(q | ¬p). However, this is equivalent to P(q | p) > P(q) when P(p) ≠ 0. Another interpretation of the default rule"if p then q" is P(q | p) > P(¬q | p) ; this implies P(q | p) > 0.5 which is obviously not preserved by the inference rules of system P in their degenerated forms. All these negative results tend to indicate that although being coherent with system P at the limit, probabilistic reasoning may offer frameworks for commonsense reasoning reasoning which strongly differ from nonmonotonic reasoning according to Gabbay's and Kraus et al.' requirements, when the underlying probabilities are no longer infinitesimal.
VII -Conclusion
The major result contained in this paper is the strong link that exists between a threevalued logic of conditional objects stemming from recent works on this topic and the core axiomatic system of nonmonotonic reasoning. The semantics offered by conditional objects is much simpler than Lehmann's preferential models, and does not need the concept of infinitesimal probability, although our construction is related to Adams' conditional logic.
These results may open the road to semantic deduction techniques for automated reasoning with exception-tolerant knowledge bases. As such the logic is very conservative and further work is needed to handle property irrelevance in the setting of conditional objects. One approach to this problem may be to implement the Rational Monotony axiom, following the path opened by Lehmann, Makinson, Gärdenfors, Pearl and others and related to David Lewis' [45] logics of counterfactuals. Recent findings reported in [25] [4] indicate that Rational Monotony is naturally captured by conditional necessity measures in possibilistic logic. However, the existing methods for computing the rational closure of a conditional knowledge base (in the sense of RM) are not entirely satisfactory. For instance they may lead to the undue inhibition of some pieces of knowledge such as the effect of blocking of property inheritance. Some works coping with these problems already exist by Geffner [ Modus ponens and resolution rule for conditional objects can be established in a similar way.
